The Method of Scientific Discovery in Peirce’s Philosophy: Deduction, Induction, and Abduction Cassiano Terra Rodrigues

Abstract.

 In this paper we will show Peirce’s distinction between deduction,
induction and abduction. The aim of the paper is to show how
Peirce changed his views on the subject, from an understanding of deduction,
induction and hypotheses as types of reasoning to understanding
them as stages of inquiry very tightly connected. In order to get a better
understanding of Peirce’s originality on this, we show Peirce’s distinctions
between qualitative and quantitative induction and between theorematical
and corollarial deduction, passing then to the distinction between
mathematics and logic. In the end, we propose a sketch of a comparison
between Peirce and Whitehead concerning the two thinkers’ view of
mathematics, hoping that this could point to further inquiries.