Bayesian Epistemology and Epistemic Conditionals: On the Status of the Export-Import Laws Horacio Arlo-Costa Carnegie Mellon University

BAYESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC CONDITIONALS:
ON THE STATUS OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT LAWS"

http://repository.cmu.edu/philosophy/3/

The notion of probability occupies a central role in contem-
porary epistemology and cognitive science. Nevertheless, the
classical notion of probability is hard to reconcile with the
central notions postulated by the epistemological tradition.' Bayesian
epistemologists have presented three main types of responses to this
problem. First, there are eliminative strategies: if notions like belief
cannot be probabilistically articulated, they have no theoretical use
and, consequently, they have to be eliminated from a mature episte-
mology. Second, there are pluralist strateges, which recommend
adopting both belief and probability as irreducible primitive notions.
Finally, there is the claim that a unified Bayesian epistemology can be
articulated around the sole postulation of a primitive notion of
conditional probability. I shall focus here on two aspects of this third
probabilistic strategy. First, I shall define both belief and belief
change from conditional probability-following an idea first pro-
posed by Bas van Fraassen2 Second, I shall argue that the Adams
hypothesis (on how to accept conditionals3) can be better articulated
and extended in this setting. Finally, I shall discuss both the internal
commitments and the range of applicability of the probabilistic view
of belief and conditionals which thus arises.