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Este blog no tiene ninguna otra finalidad que compartir y ayudar a reflexionar sobre lógica y filosofía de la lógica, filosofía de las matemáticas, de la ciencia etc.
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Gracias por seguir el blog !!!

Claudio Conforti

martes, 9 de septiembre de 2014

XVII Encuentro Internacional de Didactica de la Lógica


According to JC Beall and Greg Restall, ‘A widespread assumption in contemporary
philosophy of logic is that there is one true logic, that there is one and only one correct
answer as to whether a given argument is deductively valid’. In addition, ‘To be a pluralist
about logical consequence, you need only hold that there is more than “one true logic”’
[1, p. 476].1 And finally, ‘We hold that there is more than one sense in which arguments
may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the
name deductive validity’. [2]
But what exactly is meant by saying that there is just one ‘true logic’? Or more than
one ‘true logic’? What exactly is meant by saying that there is one and only one correct
answer as to whether a given argument is valid? Or that there is more than one correct
answer? What exactly is meant by saying there is a single sense in which arguments may
be deductively valid rather than more than one sense? Without answers to these questions
we cannot yet determine whether Beall and Restall have successfully provided an
alternative to logical orthodoxy.
In section I, I shall present Beall’s and Restall’s position—Logical Pluralism. Based on
this presentation, in section II, I shall ask some important questions about the details of
their Logical Pluralism and argue that without answers to these questions we cannot yet
determine whether Logical Pluralism is viable or even what exactly Logical Pluralism is.
In section III, I shall try to determine what exactly Logical Monism is, and, as a result,
what exactly Logical Pluralism might be. In section IV, I shall compare Monism and
Pluralism on the problem of determining that a logical system gets validity wrong by
classifying invalid arguments as valid. I shall argue that without clear answers to the
questions raised in section II we are unable to determine whether Pluralism can avoid this
problem. At the same time I will suggest some answers which must be avoided, if
Pluralism is to avoid self-refutation. I shall conclude that Beall and Restall have failed to
demonstrate the truth of their Logical Pluralism, but have still produced a serious
challenge to the very foundations of logic.


ABSTRACT. Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied
on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has
been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in
the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at
heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The
latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of
semantic information we explore.

Una defensa sistemática del pluralismo lógico por Diego Tajer

En este trabajo, realizo una defensa del pluralismo lógico en una de sus versiones.
En la primera parte, considero distintas formulaciones del pluralismo, analizo sus
fallas respectivas e introduzco la versión que defenderé, que es la de Beall y Restall
(1999, 2000, 2006). En la segunda parte, desarrollo las objeciones que cuatro monistas
(Quine, Read, Priest y Field) hicieron al pluralismo y respondo a cada una de ellas.
En particular, muestro que no afectan la posición de Beall y Restall.

In this paper, I defend one version of logical pluralism. In the first part, I consider different
formulations of pluralism, I analyze their shortcomings, and finally I introduce
the version I will defend, which is Beall and Restall’s pluralism (1999, 2000, 2006). In
the second part, I present the main objections of four monists (Quine, Read, Priest,
and Field) and then I answer to each one of them. In particular, I show that these
objections do not affect Beall and Restall’s position.

Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom: A Tour of Logical Pluralism Roy T. Cook* The University of Minnesota

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. In this article, I explore what
logical pluralism is, and what it entails, by: (i) distinguishing clearly between relativism about a particular
domain and pluralism about that domain; (ii) distinguishing between a number of forms logical
pluralism might take; (iii) attempting to distinguish between those versions of pluralism that are
clearly true and those that are might be controversial; and (iv) surveying three prominent attempts
to argue for logical pluralism and evaluating them along the criteria provided by (ii) and (iii).

lunes, 23 de junio de 2014

Logical constants: a pragmatist approach. María José Frápolli & Stavros Assimakopoulos


There is currently no general definition of logical constanthood with which all philosophers of logic agree. In this paper, we address this issue by putting forward a proposal regarding the distinctive feature of logical constants. Our background position is that by focusing too much on structural features, we have forgotten central aspects of the original motivation that gave rise to the modern study of logic along Fregean/Peircian lines. On the basis of this realization, we argue that a logical constant has to be seen as encoding some kind of dynamic meaning, which marks the presence of an inferential transition among propositional contents. Following a pragmatist rationale, according to which some notion can be identified as a logical constant by considering the way in which it is used in our everyday reasoning practices, we put forth a characterization of logical constants that takes into account their syntactic, semantic and pragmatic roles. What follows from our proposal is that logical constanthood can be best understood as a functional property that is satisfied only by certain uses of the natural-language counterparts of the conditional, negation, disjunction and the compound of conditional-plus-quantifiers. After briefly discussing these cases, we turn to conjunction in order to show why it needs to be excluded from our set of genuine logical constants.

Máster en Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia