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Este blog no tiene ninguna otra finalidad que compartir y ayudar a reflexionar sobre lógica y filosofía de la lógica, filosofía de las matemáticas, de la ciencia etc.
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Claudio Conforti

martes, 14 de octubre de 2014

Universal Logic or Logics in Resemblance Families Dale Jacquette


It is a momentous and as yet unsolved, perhaps unsolvable, question in the philosophy of logic, as to whether there is a single universal logic. The alternative is to maintain that there are only fundamentally distinct logics, some similar to others in some but not other ways, and each reflecting another logical dimension of what for convenience can be considered an island with particular dependencies in a sea of logics. The first question this essay considers, on the event of honoring Jean-Yves Beziau for his accomplishments and contributions to the program of Universal Logic, is whether there can be a universal logic, or whether a family resemblance model for overlapping different kinds of logically irreducible similarities between putatively disparate formal logical languages provides a more plausible and explanatorily fruitful model for understanding the proliferation of logics, especially since the formalization of modal and nonclassical systems. The second question is whether it makes any difference to Beziau’s Universal Logic whether there can really be a universal logic in the sense prescribed. Here the conclusion is that Beziau’s Universal Logic research program is unaffected by the unattainability of a universal logic, construed either as an ideal of reasoning or ideal theory of reasoning. Beziau’s explanations of what he means by ‘universal logic’ are sampled from both the Preface to his 2005 edited volume Logica universalis: towards a general theory of logic, and his 2014 Synthese essay, The relativity and universality of logic. The concept of universal logic and Universal Logic are critically evaluated, with the consequence that an alternative and in many ways preferable family resemblance model of similarities of different kinds selecting different logics by virtue of different partially overlapping shared properties is not seriously challenged by Beziau’s defense of logical universalism. It is one thing to recognize that reasoning is in some sense unitary, whereas theories about reasoning are legion. It is another thing to ask why there are so many logics, and consider that the reason may be that reasoning itself, though in some sense unitary, has as many different logical dimensions as there are philosophically motivated formal systems of logic. If reasoning has the loose unity of a family rather than the tight unity of a single abstract universal entity or actual dynamic psychological occurrence, then to capture the expressive and inferential structures of a selected part of thought and discourse in the entertainment and expression of which requires its own particular kind of logical reasoning.

martes, 9 de septiembre de 2014

XVII Encuentro Internacional de Didactica de la Lógica


According to JC Beall and Greg Restall, ‘A widespread assumption in contemporary
philosophy of logic is that there is one true logic, that there is one and only one correct
answer as to whether a given argument is deductively valid’. In addition, ‘To be a pluralist
about logical consequence, you need only hold that there is more than “one true logic”’
[1, p. 476].1 And finally, ‘We hold that there is more than one sense in which arguments
may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the
name deductive validity’. [2]
But what exactly is meant by saying that there is just one ‘true logic’? Or more than
one ‘true logic’? What exactly is meant by saying that there is one and only one correct
answer as to whether a given argument is valid? Or that there is more than one correct
answer? What exactly is meant by saying there is a single sense in which arguments may
be deductively valid rather than more than one sense? Without answers to these questions
we cannot yet determine whether Beall and Restall have successfully provided an
alternative to logical orthodoxy.
In section I, I shall present Beall’s and Restall’s position—Logical Pluralism. Based on
this presentation, in section II, I shall ask some important questions about the details of
their Logical Pluralism and argue that without answers to these questions we cannot yet
determine whether Logical Pluralism is viable or even what exactly Logical Pluralism is.
In section III, I shall try to determine what exactly Logical Monism is, and, as a result,
what exactly Logical Pluralism might be. In section IV, I shall compare Monism and
Pluralism on the problem of determining that a logical system gets validity wrong by
classifying invalid arguments as valid. I shall argue that without clear answers to the
questions raised in section II we are unable to determine whether Pluralism can avoid this
problem. At the same time I will suggest some answers which must be avoided, if
Pluralism is to avoid self-refutation. I shall conclude that Beall and Restall have failed to
demonstrate the truth of their Logical Pluralism, but have still produced a serious
challenge to the very foundations of logic.


ABSTRACT. Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied
on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has
been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in
the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at
heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The
latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of
semantic information we explore.

Una defensa sistemática del pluralismo lógico por Diego Tajer

En este trabajo, realizo una defensa del pluralismo lógico en una de sus versiones.
En la primera parte, considero distintas formulaciones del pluralismo, analizo sus
fallas respectivas e introduzco la versión que defenderé, que es la de Beall y Restall
(1999, 2000, 2006). En la segunda parte, desarrollo las objeciones que cuatro monistas
(Quine, Read, Priest y Field) hicieron al pluralismo y respondo a cada una de ellas.
En particular, muestro que no afectan la posición de Beall y Restall.

In this paper, I defend one version of logical pluralism. In the first part, I consider different
formulations of pluralism, I analyze their shortcomings, and finally I introduce
the version I will defend, which is Beall and Restall’s pluralism (1999, 2000, 2006). In
the second part, I present the main objections of four monists (Quine, Read, Priest,
and Field) and then I answer to each one of them. In particular, I show that these
objections do not affect Beall and Restall’s position.

Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom: A Tour of Logical Pluralism Roy T. Cook* The University of Minnesota

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. In this article, I explore what
logical pluralism is, and what it entails, by: (i) distinguishing clearly between relativism about a particular
domain and pluralism about that domain; (ii) distinguishing between a number of forms logical
pluralism might take; (iii) attempting to distinguish between those versions of pluralism that are
clearly true and those that are might be controversial; and (iv) surveying three prominent attempts
to argue for logical pluralism and evaluating them along the criteria provided by (ii) and (iii).