Bienvenidos !!!

Este blog no tiene ninguna otra finalidad que compartir y ayudar a reflexionar sobre lógica y filosofía de la lógica, filosofía de las matemáticas, de la ciencia etc.
El blog es absolutamente gratuito.Es importante difundir nuestras reflexiones, discusiones, investigaciones y logros en el campo de las disciplinas que nos apasionan .

Gracias por seguir el blog !!!

Claudio Conforti

jueves, 11 de diciembre de 2014

The Different Ways in which Logic is (said to be) Formal Catarina Dutilh Novaes

What does it mean to say that logic is formal? The short answer is: it means (or can mean) several different things.
In this paper, I argue that there are (at least) eight main variations of the notion of the formal that are relevant for current discussions in philosophy and logic, and that they are structured in two main clusters, namely the formal as pertaining to forms, and the formal as pertaining to rules. To the first cluster belong the formal as schematic;
the formal as indifference to particulars; the formal as topic-neutrality; the formal as abstraction from intentional content; the formal as de-semantification. To the second cluster belong the formal as computable; the formal as pertaining to regulative rules; the formal as pertaining to constitutive rules. I analyze each of these eight variations, providing their historical background and raising related philosophical questions. The significance of this work of ‘conceptual archeology’ is that it may enhance clarity in debates where the notion of the formal plays a prominent role (such as debates where it is expected to play a demarcating role), but where it is oftentimes used equivocally and/or imprecisely.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01445340.2011.555505

jueves, 27 de noviembre de 2014

Principios Clásicos en Lógica Molecular, Diana Costa, Patricio Fuentes, Claudio Fuentes and Manuel A. Martins

Presentación de ponencia "Classical Principles in Molecular Logic" en el "Symposium on Modelling and Simulation in Computer Sciences and Engineering". Rhodes, Greece, 22-28 September 2014
Diana Costa, Patricio Fuentes, Claudio Fuentes and Manuel A. Martins


domingo, 16 de noviembre de 2014

Lógica, Filosofía de la Lógica: 4th International Conference on Tools for Teaching...

Lógica, Filosofía de la Lógica: 4th International Conference on Tools for Teaching...: “We all know people who are very bright but who do not always shine when it comes to being logical. They have the ability to think logically...

4th International Conference on Tools for Teaching Logic 9-12 June 2015, Rennes, France

“We all know people who are very bright but who do not always shine when it comes to being logical. They have the ability to think logically —that is, clearly and effectively— but that ability does not habitually manifest itself. The likelihood is that it has never been properly developed, pointing to a deficiency in their education. Indeed, logic is the very backbone of a true education, and yet it is seldom taught as such in American schools. To my mind, logic is the missing piece of the American educational system, the subject that informs every other subject from English to history to science and math.” 
Being Logical: A Guide to Good Thinking, D.Q. McInernyhttp://ttl2015.irisa.fr/

4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TOOLS FOR TEACHING LOGIC (TTL 2015) 
June 9-­12, 2015, Rennes, France 
http://ttl2015.irisa.fr/

Call for Papers

TOPICS

Tools for Teaching Logic seeks for original papers with a clear significance in the following topics (but are not limited to): teaching logic in sciences and humanities; teaching logic at different levels of instruction (secondary education, university level, and postgraduate); didactic software; facing some difficulties concerning what to teach; international postgraduate programs; resources and challenges for e­Learning Logic; teaching Argumentation Theory, Critical Thinking and Informal Logic; teaching specific topics, such as Modal Logic, Algebraic Logic, Knowledge Representation, Model Theory, Philosophy of Logic, and others; dissemination of logic courseware and logic textbooks; teaching Logic Thinking.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

Submitted papers in PDF format should not be longer than 8 pages and must be submitted electronically using the EasyChair system:https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=ttl2015. A demonstration is expected to accompany papers describing software tools. At least one author of each accepted paper must be registered and attend TTL 2015 to present the paper or the tool.

PUBLICATIONS

All accepted papers will be published electronically in the LIPICS style by University of Rennes 1 with an ISBN (a USB key will be provided to the conference participants). After the conference, a special issue containing extended versions of the best accepted papers is going to be published in the IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications.

CONFERENCE FORMAT

Papers presentations will be presented in parallel sessions along the week. A half-day slot will be dedicated to demo tools.

IMPORTANT DATES

Paper submission:30th January 2015
Notification:1st March 2015
Final camera­ready due:29 March 2015
Conference:9-12 June 2015

Last events

martes, 14 de octubre de 2014

Universal Logic or Logics in Resemblance Families Dale Jacquette

Abstract

It is a momentous and as yet unsolved, perhaps unsolvable, question in the philosophy of logic, as to whether there is a single universal logic. The alternative is to maintain that there are only fundamentally distinct logics, some similar to others in some but not other ways, and each reflecting another logical dimension of what for convenience can be considered an island with particular dependencies in a sea of logics. The first question this essay considers, on the event of honoring Jean-Yves Beziau for his accomplishments and contributions to the program of Universal Logic, is whether there can be a universal logic, or whether a family resemblance model for overlapping different kinds of logically irreducible similarities between putatively disparate formal logical languages provides a more plausible and explanatorily fruitful model for understanding the proliferation of logics, especially since the formalization of modal and nonclassical systems. The second question is whether it makes any difference to Beziau’s Universal Logic whether there can really be a universal logic in the sense prescribed. Here the conclusion is that Beziau’s Universal Logic research program is unaffected by the unattainability of a universal logic, construed either as an ideal of reasoning or ideal theory of reasoning. Beziau’s explanations of what he means by ‘universal logic’ are sampled from both the Preface to his 2005 edited volume Logica universalis: towards a general theory of logic, and his 2014 Synthese essay, The relativity and universality of logic. The concept of universal logic and Universal Logic are critically evaluated, with the consequence that an alternative and in many ways preferable family resemblance model of similarities of different kinds selecting different logics by virtue of different partially overlapping shared properties is not seriously challenged by Beziau’s defense of logical universalism. It is one thing to recognize that reasoning is in some sense unitary, whereas theories about reasoning are legion. It is another thing to ask why there are so many logics, and consider that the reason may be that reasoning itself, though in some sense unitary, has as many different logical dimensions as there are philosophically motivated formal systems of logic. If reasoning has the loose unity of a family rather than the tight unity of a single abstract universal entity or actual dynamic psychological occurrence, then to capture the expressive and inferential structures of a selected part of thought and discourse in the entertainment and expression of which requires its own particular kind of logical reasoning.

martes, 9 de septiembre de 2014

XVII Encuentro Internacional de Didactica de la Lógica

http://www.logicauninova.blogspot.mx/

WHAT EXACTLY IS LOGICAL PLURALISM? G. C. Goddu

According to JC Beall and Greg Restall, ‘A widespread assumption in contemporary
philosophy of logic is that there is one true logic, that there is one and only one correct
answer as to whether a given argument is deductively valid’. In addition, ‘To be a pluralist
about logical consequence, you need only hold that there is more than “one true logic”’
[1, p. 476].1 And finally, ‘We hold that there is more than one sense in which arguments
may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the
name deductive validity’. [2]
But what exactly is meant by saying that there is just one ‘true logic’? Or more than
one ‘true logic’? What exactly is meant by saying that there is one and only one correct
answer as to whether a given argument is valid? Or that there is more than one correct
answer? What exactly is meant by saying there is a single sense in which arguments may
be deductively valid rather than more than one sense? Without answers to these questions
we cannot yet determine whether Beall and Restall have successfully provided an
alternative to logical orthodoxy.
In section I, I shall present Beall’s and Restall’s position—Logical Pluralism. Based on
this presentation, in section II, I shall ask some important questions about the details of
their Logical Pluralism and argue that without answers to these questions we cannot yet
determine whether Logical Pluralism is viable or even what exactly Logical Pluralism is.
In section III, I shall try to determine what exactly Logical Monism is, and, as a result,
what exactly Logical Pluralism might be. In section IV, I shall compare Monism and
Pluralism on the problem of determining that a logical system gets validity wrong by
classifying invalid arguments as valid. I shall argue that without clear answers to the
questions raised in section II we are unable to determine whether Pluralism can avoid this
problem. At the same time I will suggest some answers which must be avoided, if
Pluralism is to avoid self-refutation. I shall conclude that Beall and Restall have failed to
demonstrate the truth of their Logical Pluralism, but have still produced a serious
challenge to the very foundations of logic.

LOGICAL PLURALISM AND SEMANTIC INFORMATION PATRICK ALLO

ABSTRACT. Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied
on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has
been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in
the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at
heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The
latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of
semantic information we explore.

Una defensa sistemática del pluralismo lógico por Diego Tajer

Resumen
En este trabajo, realizo una defensa del pluralismo lógico en una de sus versiones.
En la primera parte, considero distintas formulaciones del pluralismo, analizo sus
fallas respectivas e introduzco la versión que defenderé, que es la de Beall y Restall
(1999, 2000, 2006). En la segunda parte, desarrollo las objeciones que cuatro monistas
(Quine, Read, Priest y Field) hicieron al pluralismo y respondo a cada una de ellas.
En particular, muestro que no afectan la posición de Beall y Restall.

Abstract
In this paper, I defend one version of logical pluralism. In the first part, I consider different
formulations of pluralism, I analyze their shortcomings, and finally I introduce
the version I will defend, which is Beall and Restall’s pluralism (1999, 2000, 2006). In
the second part, I present the main objections of four monists (Quine, Read, Priest,
and Field) and then I answer to each one of them. In particular, I show that these
objections do not affect Beall and Restall’s position.

Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom: A Tour of Logical Pluralism Roy T. Cook* The University of Minnesota

Abstract
Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. In this article, I explore what
logical pluralism is, and what it entails, by: (i) distinguishing clearly between relativism about a particular
domain and pluralism about that domain; (ii) distinguishing between a number of forms logical
pluralism might take; (iii) attempting to distinguish between those versions of pluralism that are
clearly true and those that are might be controversial; and (iv) surveying three prominent attempts
to argue for logical pluralism and evaluating them along the criteria provided by (ii) and (iii).

lunes, 23 de junio de 2014

Logical constants: a pragmatist approach. María José Frápolli & Stavros Assimakopoulos

Abstract


There is currently no general definition of logical constanthood with which all philosophers of logic agree. In this paper, we address this issue by putting forward a proposal regarding the distinctive feature of logical constants. Our background position is that by focusing too much on structural features, we have forgotten central aspects of the original motivation that gave rise to the modern study of logic along Fregean/Peircian lines. On the basis of this realization, we argue that a logical constant has to be seen as encoding some kind of dynamic meaning, which marks the presence of an inferential transition among propositional contents. Following a pragmatist rationale, according to which some notion can be identified as a logical constant by considering the way in which it is used in our everyday reasoning practices, we put forth a characterization of logical constants that takes into account their syntactic, semantic and pragmatic roles. What follows from our proposal is that logical constanthood can be best understood as a functional property that is satisfied only by certain uses of the natural-language counterparts of the conditional, negation, disjunction and the compound of conditional-plus-quantifiers. After briefly discussing these cases, we turn to conjunction in order to show why it needs to be excluded from our set of genuine logical constants.

Máster en Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia