La lógica universal no es principio lo que uno pensaría.... muy interesante!!!
1- . Although your proposal to develop a universal logic is
very appealing, isn’t it a utopian one? Isn’t it an absurd, or even
dangerous thing to believe that it would be possible to develop a
unique logic accounting for everything?
Let us immediately reject some misunderstanding; universal logic, as
I understand it, is not one universal logic. In fact, from the viewpoint of
universal logic the existence of one universal logic is not even possible, and
this is a result that can easily be shown. One might thus say somehow
ironically the following: according to universal logic there is no universal
Some people in some countries have always tried to elaborate a universal
system that would account for any sort of reasoning, or reasoning
as a whole. Aristotelian logic was depicted itself as a universal one. More
recently, first-order classical logic appeared to some as a universal system
accounting for mathematical reasoning as well as current one, that is, the
one used to buy your bread at the bakery.
But first-order classical logic was also criticized at length, whether
concerning its claim to describe mathematical reasoning or physical, computational,
current, philosophical ones, and the like. Many new logics were
further developed, namely: intuitionistic logic, combinatory logic, linear
logic, quantum logic, erotetic logic, modal logic, paraconsistent logic, polar
logic, relevant logic and so many others, all the more that each of these is
often to be divided into a disparate multiplicity, as in the case of modal
Among advocates of these logics, some forcefully believe that their
own logic is the best one, that it explains everything, solves everything,
so that their logic is universal, as was formerly the case with Stanis law
Le´sniewski or, more recently, with Jean-Yves Girard and its linear logic,
Jaakko Hintikka and its IF logic, and, even more explicitly, Ross Brady
with its relevant logic he squarely dubbed a “universal logic”.
Such a view is not shared by people working in quantum logic, for
example; indeed, these only want to account for one particular reasoning
related to one particular area, without ever claiming that such is the reasoning
we are using or should use whenever we go at the bakery. Now is
such a view consistent? Are we entitled to say the following: to each area,
to each situation, its own logic, or even to each group of persons, to each
individual, its own logic. So there would be a logic of chemistry, logic of
clouds, logic of sex, logic of women, logic of dogs, the logic of Bouvard and
the logic of P´ecuchet.
Actually, such a relativization of logic is equally absurd as the opposite
stance according to which only one logic could explain everything.
Obviously, there is also one intermediary situation according to which there
are neither only one nor thousand and one logics, but three or four: so is
the middle, not to say mediocre position of people who cut the cake into
three parts saying that there is the reasoning for formal sciences, on the one
hand, the reasoning for empirical sciences, on the other hand, and finally
the natural reasoning for daily life. Behind such a stance we see again the
old contradistinction between inductive logic and deductive logic.
The view of universal logic is that one plausibly can unify the large
kaleidoscopic variety of logics, while preserving their diversity. In the case of
universal logic, as opposed to those who support the view of one universal
logic, unity is entailed by diversity. Universal logic is not a logic but a
general theory of different logics. This general theory is no more a logic
itself than is meteorology a cloud.